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Drafi Recommendolfu)n
on a European security policy
The Assembly,
(i) Stressing that the aim of WEU is to achieve the effective strengthening of European security and
that institutional concerns must in no case weaken efforts to this end;(ii) Recalling that the modified Brussels Treaty is one of the essential bases for ensuring this security;
(!ii1 Regretting, therefore, that the Council has failed to take advantage of the opportunity of the
fortieth anniversary of the treaty, which also coincided with that of the tenth anniversary of the ieactiva-
tion of WEU, to draw the attention of the public at large to progress achieved by WEU since 1984;(iv) Convinced that the development of a European defence policy by the Council of WEU is conditio-
nal upon the achievement of a European security policy based on a common perception of risks and dan-
gers and on a joint concept regarding the means of countering them;(y) Deploring the lack of information from the Council regarding its co-operation and contribution in
this respect in the framework of the CFSP and NATO;
(vi) Recalling Recommendations 556,558 and 559;
(vii) Rejecting paragraph 3 of the reply of the Council to Recommendation 559, in which the latter
refuses to provide the Assembly with information on work undertaken in the framework of the CFSP on
questions relating to the modified Brussels Treaty;
(viii) Yoicng its protest that the Council transmitted to the Assembly the fust part of the fortieth annual
report on its activities only on 9th November 1994 and deploring that the WEU Secretary-General no lon-
ger sends the Assembly his information letter;
(ix) Aware that it is crucial to settle the substantive issues relating to the development of a European
security and defence policy and that the Council seems to be giving priority to studring these questions;(x) Convinced nevertheless that the Council should not defer discussion of institutional problems in
this connection until 1996, leaving the initiative in the interim to other European institutions;-
(xi) Recalling the decision of the European Council to create a study group in preparation for the 1996
intergolemmentql conference which is to start work in June 1995 with ihe particlpalion of two members
of the European Parliament;
(xii) Reaffirming that the supervision of security and defence policy in Europe is a prerogative of the
national parliaments;
(-riit,) Insisting therefore that the WEU Assembly should participate fully in the preparations for WEU's
planned review of the present provisions of the Maastricht Treaty concerning the Common foreign and
security policy, in accordance with declaration ID8 of the WEU member countries annexed to theVaas-
tricht Treaty;
(xiv) Fearing that the refusal of certain countries participating in the CFSP to accede to the modified
Brussels Treaty might diminish the effectiveness of co-operation between the CFSP and WEU;
(xv) Fearing also that the refusal of the WEU Council to admit all the European NATO member coun-
ffies to full membership of WEU may complicate the implementation of WEU's r6le as the European
pillar of NATO;
(rui) Wishing ryPU to act as a political driving force vis-i-vis the authorities of the European Union
and the Atlantic Alliance and not consider that its main task is to carry out decisions taken by these two
organisations;
(xvii) Recalling nevertheless that since the Council has promised the European Union to provide assistance
in policing the town of Mostar, it is of the utmost importance for the latter to honour its commitments in full;
(niii) Deploring that meetings of the WEU Council are divided into four different categories of partici-
pant-countries 
- 
full members, associate members, associate partners, observers 
- 
raisei the problem of
multi-speed_co-operation within WEU and the attendant risk of its political action being paralysed by ins-
tirutional infighting, as was the case over the issue of Rwanda;
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(xix) Wishing WEU to examine subsequent accession by its associate partners by basing itself essential-
ly on the criteria of the modified Brussels Treaty;
(xx) Stressing that it is WEU's primary responsibility to ensure that, in the framework of harmonising
procedures with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance for linking these countries with Euro-
Atlantic structureso security considerations are a means of speeding up this process and not a pretext for
holding it back;
(nri) Recalling that the Assembly cannot grant associate member and associate pafiner delegations rights
which exceed the status the Council has granted them;
(xrii) Stressing that the enlargement of WEU towards the East is intended to reinforce the security and
stability of Europe as a whole and not to create new divisions;
(xriii) Recatling in consequence the importance of sfiengthening the collective security system in the frame-
work of the CSCE and of establishing a stable partnership with Russia and the other members of the CIS;
(xxiv) Wishing the problems raised by the harmonisation of the presidencies of WEU and the European
Union to be settled quickly in order to ensure the continuity of WEU's political action;
(xxv) Recalling the important r6le of its Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations in reinforcing
the impact of the work of the Assembly with parliaments, public opinion and the governments of the mem-
ber countries,
Rrcorrnmxos rHAT rne CouNcu-
l. In accordance with its declaration ID8 annexed to the Maastricht Treaty, create a special working
group tasked with studying institutional questions relating to the preparation of the 1996 intergovernmen-
tal conference;
2. Decide that this working group will begin work in early 1995 and that the Assembly will be asso-
ciated with it;
3. Play the r6le of a political driving force vis-d-vis the authorities of the European Union and the
Atlantic Alliance with a view to developing guidelines for linking the Central and Eastem European coun-
tries with Euro-Atlantic structures;
4. Open up real prospects of accession to the modified Brussels Treaty for associate partner countries,
irrespective of whether or not they belong to other European organisations;
5. In so doing, ensure that any future enlargement of WEU does not weaken the scope of Article V of
the modified Brussels Treaty;
6. On the same basis, examine whether conditions have been met for granting Slovenia associate part-
ner status;
7. Include in its present studies the French Prime Minister's proposal for drafting a white paper on
European security and ensure that the outcome of its examination of the development of a European
defence policy provides the main source of inspiration for the thinking process to be conducted in the fra-
mework of the CFSP and NAIO;
8. lnform the Assembly of the areas and the content of its co-operation with the CFSP and NATO;
9. Contribute actively to the success of the conference on the stability pact in Europe;
10. Work out a joint position with a view to its contribution to the CSCE ministerial conference in
Budapest and inform the Assembly of the action taken to follow up its declared intention of 9th May 1994
of strengthening the CSCE " to avoid the emergence of new divisions " and to work for " a reasonable
division of labour with the CSCE ";
11. Make its views known in a more convincing and visible manner in the United Nations and arrange
for WEU to speak with one voice in the Security Council of that organisation;
12. Follow closely the problems of security in the Mediterranean and inform the Assembly of the action
it has taken on Recommendation 538 as it undertook to do in its reply to that recommendation;
13. lnform the Assembly of the results of studies undertaken by the Council on unresolved questions
relating to the harmonisation of the presidencies of WEU and the European Union;
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14. Avoid the effectiveness of WEU's action being jeopardised by the development of work conducted
with different forms of participation within the organisation and at different speeds in specific areas;
15. Study the conditions in which the WEU Council might meet as a European securiry and defence
council, either as necessary or on the occasion of meetings of the European Council;
16. Organise a regular exchange of senior civil servants between " WELI " departments established in
ministries for foreign affairs and defence and in the private offices of the heads of govemment of member
states;
17. Comply immediately with its obligations under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty by sub-
mitting its annual report to the Assembly so that the latter can reply before the report loses its topicaliry,
account being taken of the fact that this is not the frst time that the repofi has arrived very late;
18. Continue to inform the Assembly of all activities under the modified Brussels Treaty, even if exer-




on a European securtty poli.cy
The Assembly,
(i) Considering:
(a) the document on a status of association of WEU with the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech
Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Lawia, the Repu-
blic of Lithuania, the Republic of Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic;
(b) the declaration further to the document on associate membership of WEU of 20th November
t992,
which texts were transmitted by the Council to the Assembly following the ministerial meeting held at
Kirchberg, Luxembourg, on 9th May 1994;
(ii) Considering that the declaration referred to in paragraph (b) above states that it " does not entail any
changes to the document on associate membership adopted in Rome on 20th November 1992;
(iii) Taking the view therefore that this declaration does not contain elements requiring a re-examination of
the measures Arawn up by the Assembly for the participation of delegations of associate member countries;
(iv) Recalling nevertheless its Recommendation 558;
(v) Recatling also Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty which states that the WEU Assembly is
composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council
of Europe;
(vi) Noting that the o'document on the modalities ", dated 3rd May 1994, stipulates that:
" The provisions of this document apply as from today.
The status will formally be achieved when:
- 
the Hellenic Republic, currently an active observer, becomes a member of WEU and the Repu-
blic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Turkey, currently active observers,
become associate members of WEU;
- 
the associate partner has signed a Europe Agreement with the European Union.
In the meantime the associate partners will be considered as active observers to WEU with respect
to the provisions of their new status. ";
(vii) Recalling the decision taken by the Presidential Committee on 18th October 1994 to enlarge the per-
manent observer delegations of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia from
two to fow members and to invite the nine associate parmer counfries each to appoint one observer to the Poli.
tical, Defence and Technological and Aerospace Committees and to the Committee for Parliamentary and
Public Relations without prejudging the eventual adoption of a stafus for the delegations of these countries;
(vlii) Considering the brief assigned by the Presidential Committee to the Political Committee to propose a
substantive text on the adoption of an appropriate status for the delegations of countries that became asso-
ciate partners prior to the question being placed before the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges;
(ix) Recalling its Order 85 on the enlargement of WEU and in particular paragraph (vii) of the p;eamble
drawing attention to the fact that " any reasonable enlargement of the number of parliamentary delegations
participating in the Assembly will be impossible without major adjustments of the Assembly's accommo-
dation and budget ";
(x) Noting with surprise that, despite its repeated approaches to the Council, the latter has not taken
action on the pressing demands formulated by the Assembly in this respect;
(xi) Regretting also that the Council has not provided any information on the arrangements for financial
contributions by the associate partners to WEU's budget;
(xii) Stressing the need nevertheless to avoid any further delay in making official participation of parlia-
mentarians from states which have become associate partners of WEU,
Ilrvrres rrs CoNfivnmEE oN RULEs oF PRocEDLJRE exo Pnrvl-ncss




(submiazd by Mr. Soell, Rapporteur)
I.Introduction
1. The task of beginning work on the defi-
nition of a common European defence policy,
entrusted to the Permanent Council of WEU
in Luxembourg on 9th May 1994, marks the
beginning of an ambitious and difficult enter-
prise, as it closely affects areas in which the
sovereignty of the states concerned has so far
been absolute.
2. However, as stated in its Recommendation
558 adopted on l4th June 1994, the Assembly of
WEU is convinced that now is the time for WEU
to undertake this task as a matter of priority. It
therefore warmly endorses the Council's initiative.
The Assembly nevertheless recalls that the best
studies by diplomats and military experts are not
enough to get a project off the ground, realisation
of which depends primarily on the political will of
the member countries. Hence in assigning this
task to the Permanent Council, the Council cannot
absolve itself of its own political responsibility,
namely the pursuit of a European security policy,
having been created expressly for that purpose in
accordance with Article VIII, paragraph 1, of the
modffied Brussels Treaty.
3. A European defence policy and, even more
so, a European defence is dependent on the achie-
vement of a European security policy based on ajoint perception of risks and threats to European
security, and a joint concept of the ways in which
this security should be guaranteed, including ins-
titutional questions 
- 
in short, on harmonisation
of political interests and objectives in external
security matters. It is clear that all these necessary
conditions for the creation of a common policy
have not as yet been met. One must therefore
work towards creating the conditions necessary
for a common European security policy. This falls
to WEU both under its founding treaty and under
the Maastricht Treaty, given that any direction
Europe is preparing [o lake in extenial security
policy matters will inevitably have implications in
the defence field.
4. In order to remove the obstacles that conti-
nue to stand in the way of development of a true
common European security and defence policy,
these must frst be identified and their causes esta-
blished so that the appropriate means of overco-
ming them can then be sought. The present report
therefore proposes to make a contribution to the
work that is essential if Europeans wish to take
control of their own security to meet the chal-
lenges of the future and avoid Europe's being
unable to act or react in the event of a crisis (as in
the case of the conflict in former Yugoslavia, in
Somalia or Rwanda); at the same time this report
can be regarded as an initial conffibution to the
preparation of the intergovernmental conference
on the review of Title V of the Maastricht Treaty
scheduled to begin n 1996.
5. This report, moreover, provides an oppor-
tunity to reaffirm the vital responsibility of the
parliaments of our member countries in develo-
ping a European security and defence policy. A
demonstration of this responsibility was the collo-
quy held by the WEU Assembly in Paris, on 17th
October 1994, on the subject " organising our
security " to which were invited the chairmen of
the foreign affairs and defence committees of the
national parliaments of the WEU member coun-
tries, associate members, associate partners and
observer countries together with a delegation
from the two houses of the parliament of the Rus-
sian Federation. This first colloquy of its type,
organised on the initiative of Mr. Baumel, Chair-
man of the Defence Committee of the Assembly,
allowed a very lively debate to be held around
addresses given, inter alia, by the ministers of
defence of France and the Netherlands; it was thus
regarded as an initial step towards strengthening
co-operation between our parliaments, and one
which would be followed by other meetings of a
similar nature.
II. Dffiring interests and attempts
to achieve harmonisalion
6. A rough comparision of the defence white
papers published recently by three WEU member
countries (France, the United Kingdom and Ger-
many) can provide a useful insight into the simila-
rities and differences that exist at present between
these three countries in their views on security
and their policy objectives in security and defence
matters.
7. The primary objective of France's defence
policy, as set out nthe 1994 French defence white
paper, is " to defend France's interests ". This
states specifically that:
" The primary objective of France's defence
policy is therefore to defend the country's
6
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vital and strategic interests and those
with a bearing on France's internatio-
nal responsibilities and position in the
world... "
8. The second objective is summarised under
the heading: Build Europe and contribute to inter-
national stability. " ... France's ability to maintain
its position in the world will be linked in large
measure to its ability to influence the building and
the future development of Europe. " ln the context
of building Europe in security and defence mat-
ters, the French white paper states that " two
extreme options are to be ruled out: sole reliance
on ad hoc coalitions and the option of orying to
create an integrated military organisation in a
federal-type European framework ".
9. " ...the building of defence Europe is
dependent on the willingness of three states
(France, the United Kingdom and Germany) to
harmonise their view of their security interests by
deepening their co-operation ando as necessary,
pooling their military assets... Specific relations
should also be developed with our other part-
ners ... " Among such partners the white paper
specifically mentions Belgium, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Spain and Sweden.
10. ln matters relating to the intemational fra-
mework of France's defence policy, the European
ambition 
- 
which provides the context for the
wish to strengthen WEU 
- 
is placed before the
description of a renewed Atlantic Alliance which,
according to the white paper, oo must also become
a place for asserting the European defence and
security identity ".
1 1. The French white paper makes several refe-
rences to the country's interests in relation to the
security and stability of specific regions of the
world such as Africa, for example, where France's
action o' is more an acknowledgement of its inter-
national responsibilities in an area where it can
exercise its influence than a strategic concem ".
12. Moreover, o' ...thenewdemocraciesofCen-
tral and Eastem Europe, with whom a series of
bilateral agreements have been concluded in a
matter of years, will have greater priority in the
allocation of the resources of military co-opera-
tion '0.
13. As to the United Kingdom,the Secretary of
State for Defence, in a statement on the 1994
defence budget, defined national defence policy
in the following terms:
" From our immediate security perspective,
perhaps the key factor will be the evolution
of Russia; and we have a keen interest in
the continuing independence and integrity
of the new democracies of Central and Eas-
tern Europe.
The United Kingdom's defence policy is
designed to support our wider security poli-
cy, which is to maintain the freedom and
territorial integrity of the United Kingdom
and its dependent territories, and its ability
to pursue its legitimate interests at home
and abroad. "
14. However:
" As our political and economic interests
become increasingly linked to those of our
international partners, so our security inter-
ests will increasingly be pursued in a multi-
lateral context. ... Thus, whilst our defence
and security policies are likely to retain
specifically British elements with a com-
mensurate ability for national action, and
whilst healthy bilateral defence relation-
ships with the United States, our European
partners and with others will remain impor-
tant both for constructive policy-making
and for our own defence effectiveness, the
multilateral dimension will increasingly
influence our judgments about the pro-
grammes we choose to implement. It may
also affect the types of operation in which
our armed forces become involved and the
scale of their commitment. "
15. Chapter 3 of Germany's white paper on
national security and the situation and future of
the Bundeswehr, published in April 1994, defines
the " values and interests " of Germany in the fol-
lowing terms:
" The values laid down in the Basic Law
guide the interests on which Germany
bases its action in the field of security
policy. By establishing a constitutional
mandate to safeguard peace, to work
towards European unity, to settle conflicts
by peaceful means and to join a system of
collective security, the Basic Law has laid
major cornerstones for determining Ger-
man securiry interests.
German security policy has to take account
of constant political factors and parameters
with a long-term effect: the geopolitically
central location of Germany, as the country
with the most neighbours in Europe; its
economic situation as an industrialised
nation dependent on exports and firmly
interwoven with the world economy; and
finally the experiences of German and
European history. All this sets standards for
the objectives, substance and procedures
of German policy and plays a part in the
way in which it is perceived by Germany's
neighbours.
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German forergn and security policy is gui-
ded by five central interests:
- 
preservation of the freedom, security and
welfare of the citizens of Germany and
the territorial integrity of the German
state;
- 
integration with the European democra-
cies in the European Union, for demo-
cracy, the rule of law and prosperiry in
Europe mean peace and security for Ger-
many, too;
- 
the lasting transatlantic alliance, based
on a community of values and similar
interests, with the United States as a
world power, for the potential of the Uni-
ted States is indispensable for internatio-
nal stability;
- 
the familiarisation of our neighbours in
Eastern Europe with western structures
in a spirit of reconciliation and partner-
ship and the creation of a new co-opera-
tive security order embracing all the
states of Europe;
- 
worldwide respect for international law
and human rights and a just world econo-
mic order based on market principles, for
the security of the individual states is
guaranteed only in a system of global
security with peace, justice and well-
being for everyone.
Germany is not impacted by all risks to the
same extent. Its security is directly affected
by how the situation in Central, Eastern and
Southeastern Europe develops. It is indi-
rectly affected by unstable conditions in the
Mediterranean, the Middle East and South-
western Asia. Germany's security is also
affected by destabilising developments in
other parts of the world. "
16. While these three documents all allude in
one way or another to the importance of European
and ffansatlantic co-operation, it is nevertheless
clear that the aims of the policies of the countries
in question are defined in terms of purely national
interests. Only the German white paper regards
the promotion of the integration of European
democracies into the European Union as one of
the counbry's essential interests. However, in the
foregoing documents there is nothing to imply
that the harmonisation of national interests consti-
tutes an important goal, nor is inspiration drawn
from the objectives of the common foreign and
security policy described in Article J.l of the
Maastricht Treaty.
17. One could no doubt go on to examine the
position of the other WEU member countries in
this regard 
- 
to a:rive at the conclusion published
at the end of July by an expert of the WEU Insti-
tute for Security Studies ', which states thato'what has been missing up to now is an identity
of interests between the states of the Union in
matters of security policy and a common strategic
concept regarding when and where it would be
essential to make a commitment in the area of
military management of crises ".
18. In this situation the proposal presented by
Mr. Lellouche on behalf of the delegation of the
French National Assembly to the European Com-
munities, according to which the European Union
should prep:re a white paper on European de-
fence 2o is interesting, but it should be used to
exert pressure on the European countries concer-
ned to harmonise their ideas and policies not only
from a strictly military viewpoint but also from a
security angle in the broadest sense. It would the-
refore seem that the initiative announced at the
end of August by the French Prime Minister
Edouard Balladur 3 for drafting a white paper on
security in Europe which would highlight Euro-
pe's specific interests and define the means neces-
sary for defending them in liaison with the Atlan-
tic Alliance is a move in the right direction.
19. In this connection, your Rapporteur sup-
ports the analysis of the WEU Institute for Secu-
rity Studies expert in the article referred to above
according to which:
"... Above all it is necessary to agree on a
concept of security policy specific to the
Union which takes account of the whole
range of possible political, economic and
military reactions. This can but be based on
the precise determination of joint interests
in security mafters towards given regions
(Cenfral and Eastern Europe, the Balkans,
the Mediterranean, North and Central Afri-
ca). The simple enumeration of objectives
in matters of peace policy and stability that
are general and therefore not binding to any
great extent, such as those mentioned so far
in the framework of the common foreign
and security policy, is of little use. "
20. It should be recalled once more in this
context that the WEU Council's obligation to
agree on cornmon principles extends to any region
of the world where a situation arises that might
constitute a threat to peace.
21. Public debate on the method ormethods for
achieving the desired objective, in other words
L Mathias Jopp: Langer Weg 
- 
Kiihnes Zel: Gemeinsame
Verteidigungspolitik in Europa Archiv, Folge 13 -l 4 I 1994,
page397.
2. Europe and is security 
- 
an information report received
by the Presidency of the National Assembly on 31st May
1994.
3. The Figaro, 2nd September 1994.
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reaching agreement on a common concept for
organising European security, is growing more
intense: the larger the European Union and WEU
become, the more these two organisations and the
Atlantic Alliance are opening up towards the East,
as 1996, the year in which the intergovernmental
conference to review the Maastricht Treaty is due
to start, approaches.
22. This debate concerns both the basic sub-
stance of security policy and fundamental institu-
tional questions, two aspects that are closely lin-
ked. On matters of substance, three main concepts
are still competing even if they are considered to
be complementary.
23. The frst is the concept of a collective secu-
rity system according to which crisis-manage-
ment and prevention are based on rules of co-ope-
ration befween all the participants in the system.
This is the principle on which the United Nations,
the CSCE and other forms of regional organisa-
tions of the United Nations are based. The second
approach is to ensure security by defensive
alliances such as WEU and NAIO, while the third
favours security through integration of a group of
states, as proposed by the European Union.
24. In Recommendation 559, the Assembly
asked to be informed of the results of the study on
mutually reinforcing institutions, recently comple-
ted within the framework of the " security " group
of the common foreign and security policy, which
establishes criteria for better co-operation between
the United Nations, the CSCE, the European
Union, WEU, NATO and the Council of Europe in
conflict-prevention and crisis-management.
25. The Council's reply to this recommenda-
tion is revealing. First it informs the Assembly
that oo the Council has already taken several initia-
tives in the field of crisis-management and
conflict prevention in the context of the emerging
common foreign and security policy (CFSP) " and
then states that " the Council cannot report on
the results of the work undertaken by working
groups of the European Union dealing with CFSP
matters o'.
26. The Assembly cannot accept this refusal to
provide information which fails to accord with the
obligations of the Council under Article IX of the
modified Brussels Treaty. The Assembly must
remind the Council that it still has responsibility
for supervising the application of the treaty as a
whole and that it must reply to recommendations
and questions conceming the application of the
treaty even if exercised in a framework other than
that of WEU and especially when the Council
contributes to the work of another organisation.
So far, the Council has always accepted this prin-
ciple, and in the past has even transmitted certain
Assembly recommendations to other organisa-
tions, NAIO for example, in order to be able to
reply to them. Quite recently the Council, in its
answer to Written Question 326 put by Mr. Goe-
rens, sffessed oo its determination to exercise its
powers, even though 
- 
in order to avoid duplica-
tion 
- 
it may acknowledge that certain work is
best conducted within the context of NATO or the
European Union ".
27. In the same answer, the Council also stated
that it did not " consider its competences to be
modified since the reactivation of WEU " and that
it had " moreover, replied to all the Assembly's
recommendations andwill continue to do so inthe
future. " Nevertheless this answer is not entirely
unambiguous. Hitherto, the Council has always
drawn a clear distinction between the exercise of
its competences and its competences as such.
Thus the transfer of the exercise of its social and
cultural responsibilities to the Council of Europe
affected the Council's activity and not its respon-
sibilities as such, as the Council itself stated in its
annual report on its activities in 1959. Its decision
n 1970 to cease its activities in economic matters
was taken in accordance with the same principle.
28. It is all the more surprising to learn now,
though the Council's answer to Written Question
326,that:
" The Council is of the view that WEU,
which ceased to exercise its economic com-
petences tu:.1970,does not have the compe-
tence 4 to deal with the issues of financial
compensation for the riparian countries
implementing the Danube embargo. "
Unless this is mere legal sloppiness in the drafting
of this answer, it would mean that the Council has
abandoned the distinction between the exercise of
its powers and those powers in themselves, which
would have extremely serious consequences at a
time when WEU must give practical expression to
its r6le as an integml part of the development of
the European Union and as the European pillar of
the Atlantic Alliance.
29. Nor can the Assembly accept that, in the
answer referred to above " the Council devotes
special attention to questions and recommenda-
tions relating to WEU's direct responsibilities 5,
and merely indicates to the Assembly the organi-
sation primarily competent for other issues which
are raised ". What are these " direct responsibili-
ties " if the Council is maintaining at the same
time that its competences have not been modified
since the reactivation of WEU? The Assembly
therefore insists that the Council continue to
provide information on all of its activities in the
areas of its responsibilities and, in this connection,





30. This information is the more necessary as
the raison d'6tre of the traditional defence
alliances such as NATO and WEU seems to be
increasingly called into question, both within
and without. An example that might be quoted of
such questioning from outside is Russia's atti-
tude towards NAIO following the dissolution of
the Warsaw Pact and the wish of the majority of
Central and Eastern European countries to
become members of NATO in order to benefit
from the reliable protection of the American
umbrella.
31. For Russia, there is no longer any place for
traditional NATO missions, namely to ensure the
defence of Europe, as there is no longer an enemy.
On the basis of this reasoning, Mr. Kozyrev,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia, recently
proposed making the CSCE the central organisa-
tion for maintaining security and stability on the
European continent. If the CSCE were to co-
ordinate NATO and WEU efforts, the latter would
then become subordinate to the CSCE.
32. The Russian proposal to develop the North
Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) in close
liaison with the CSCE is, however, the conse-
quence of an evolution which started in NATO
itself according to which the latter might be trans-
formed into a Euro-Atlantic security system based
on a strategic concept giving precedence to a
wider vision of stability and security. Under this
new philosophy it becomes dfficult to make the
distinction between an enlarged NATO mandate
and the global approach of the CSCE 6. The intro-
duction of the partnership for peace, offered to all
NACC and CSCE member counfries, reinforces
this trend and places participants in peace-
keeping measures either under the authority of
the United Nations or under CSCE responsi-
bility.
33. Another reason why the traditional mis-
sions of the alliances are being called into ques-
tion is because the Secretary-General of the Uni-
ted Nations is tending to restrict the right of
legitimate individual and collective defence gua-
ranteed by Article 51 of the United Nations Char-
ter and to strengthen instead the rights and powers
of the Security Council. This tendency is reinfor-
ced, as far as the Atlantic Alliance is concemed,
by a reduction in the importance accorded to
mutual assistance obligations in the event of
armed aggression in favour of a wider interpreta-
tion of Article 4 of the Washington Treaty which
allows NATO to intervene o' out of area " to main-
tain and enforce peace within the framework of
crisis-prevention and management. Although
NATO sfresses its independence in relation to the
6. Wemer Bauwens, Bruno Colson etc.: The CSCE and the
changing r6le of NATO and the European Union, NATO
Review, No. 3, June 1994.
United Nations in this area, it has to be admitted
that NAIO action not authorised by the United
Nations is hardly conceivable.
34. Questioning from inside is evident in Euro-
pean efforts to substitute for the traditional
alliances in Europe an integration of states in a
new type of entity in which decision-making
through intergovernmental co-operation would
gradually give way to supranational procedures
and decisions by qualified majority. Some are
even calling for a new transatlantic treaty to take
the place of the present alliance.
35. Divergences between advocates of retai-
ning an intergovernmental system and those of a
supranational system remain, as also between
those who favour frst deepening the European
Union and those who stress the importance of
enlarging the Union or who are convinced that it
is possible to go deeper without abandoning enlar-
gement.
36. Even before this enlargement of the Euro-
pean Union becomes a reality, a new debate has
recently arisen, particularly in France and Ger-
many, on the expediency of a multi-speed Europe,
to consist of circles of co-operation of varying
intensity. The Rapporteur is however of the opi-
nion that the aim of further advancing matters
European cannot be achieved by creating a central
nucleus, since even among the small number of
participants in such a nucleus, differing interests
still persist.
37. Study of the various proposals put forward,
among others by Mr. Lamassoure, the French
Minister for European Affairs, for a new founding
contract', by the French Prime Minister, Mr. Bal-
ladur, for a Europe organised in three concentric
circles 8 and by the Christian Democrat Group of
the German Parliament e, influenced in part by a
study published in 1994 by the Bertelsmann
Foundation on " Europe 96: reform prograrnme
for the European Union'o reveals that these pro-
posals merit careful analysis above all in the area
of the organisation of security and defence.
38. It is not the Rapporteur's intention to dis-
cuss the timeliness or otherwise of launching a
public debate on the usefulness of creating a
nucleus in the context of building Europe and
designating the countries of which it might
consist when preparations are underway in three
Scandinavian countries for difficult referendums
on entry into the European Union and the coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe are wonde-
ring whether they will be accepted into the Euro-
pean and Atlantic institutions, when and under
7. k Monde, 3lst May 1994.
8. L,e Figaro, 30th August 1994.
9. [r Figaro, 6th September 1994; Frankfurter Allgemeine
7*idng, 6th September I 994.
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what terms. However the initiatives referred to
above have the merit of raising fundamental pro-
blems and enabling them to be debated publicly
before government civil servants and officials in
Brussels begin their work. The Rapporteur
would nevertheless wish to stress, flrst, that he is
not in favour of the creation of an exclusive club
of member states; second that the criteria for the
advancement of Europe should be defined by all
participant states; third, that those who remain
outside the discussions will have no right to
contribute to the decisions to be taken; fourth,
that the national parliaments must participate in
the work on reform and fifth that a nucleus exists
in security and defence maffers, namely WEU
(see paragraph 49 below).
39. It will flust be noted that none of the ideas
or projects put forward in the recent past pro-
poses a complete merger between the European
Union and WEU in the foreseeable future. While
the Institute for Security Studies expert r0 does
not foresee the incorporation of WEU in the
Union until after 1998, * at the earliest o', if cer-
tain conditions are met, the CDU/CSU document
is asking for the 1996 conference to lead to a
" reorganisation o' of relations between WEU
and the European Union with a view to " trans-
forming NATO into a balanced alliance between
the United States, Canada and Europe, as a unit
capable of acting. "
40. According to the study by the Bertelsmann
Foundation the most that would be achievable
in the foreseeable future would be a mixture
of intergovernmental co-operation on the one
hand and supranational crisis-management and
intervention on the other. In this contexto the
authors of this document are asking that WEU
be " finally consolidated as the security and
defence instrument of the European Union and
as such as the European pillar of the Atlantic
Alliance ".
41. The thoughts expressed by the French
Prime Minister, Mr. Balladur, tending towards
'o pursuing efforts to make Western European
Union a true European alliance that will enable
the European Union to ensure, itself, the security
of its members rr o' follow the same lines.
42. However, at the end of the day, while there
is general agreement on the need for the European
countries to acquire an identity of interests and a
capability of acting together in matters of security
and defence, an in-depth examination of how this
might be achieved is still lacking and none of the
projects referred to above provides a recipe for
identifying the real difficulties and overcoming
them.
10. See paragraph 17 above.
ll. Le Figaro,30th August 1994.
III. Organising European security 
-
an in s titutional pr o hlt m?
43. In practical politics, it can be observed that
the constitutional approach represents the essen-
tial means of promoting Europe's security and
defence identity. There is general agreement in
thinking (although this conviction is not well-
founded) that the harmonisation of positions andjoint decision-making will be facilitated if the
process of co-operation extends beyond the pure-
ly intergovernmental stage. While the Maastricht
Treaty has retained the intergovernmental compo-
nent and Title V on a common foreign and secur-
ity policy has strengthened the hand of the presi-
dency, it has introduced the decision-making
process by qualified majority in certain cases, in
particular for implementing joint action and has
granted the European Commission 
- 
the main
supranational component of the Union 
- 
rights of
initiative and of participation. It is certain that
advocates of a tighter community approach to
decision-making regard the treaty in its present
form merely as a stage on the road towards a true
community system.
4. On the assumption that interests relating to
key fields which have until now been the exclus-
ive province of national sovereignty could be bet-
ter harmonised in a European Union evolving
towards a community, moves were started in the
period between the adoption of the Single Euro-
pean Act in 1986leading up to the conclusion of
the Maastricht Treaty in December 1991, to
encourage the Tlvelve to co-ordinate their posi-
tions more closely on the political and economic
aspects of security in order finally to create, with
the Maastricht Treaty, a true foreign and security
policy, comprising the whole range of questions
relating to the security of the European Union,
including the eventual framing of a common
defence policy.
45. Concerning areas relating to the security
dimension, the European Council stated at its
Lisbon meeting on 26th and2TthJune 1992 those
that might, from the entry into force of the Maas-




the policy of disarmament and arms





the economic aspects of security, in par-
ticular control of the transfer of military
technology to third countries and control
of arms exports.
46. For considering the elements which will be
necessary to the Union in the framework of the
common foreign and security policy, the Euro-
pean Council, at the same meeting, formed an ad
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hoc security working group within the Political
Committee in accordance with Article J.8, para-
graph 5, of the Maasricht Treaty. The status and
tasks of this group, like those of the common
foreign and security policy Political Committee,
have still not been made known to the WEU
Assembly. Nor does your Rapporteur know whe-
ther the WEU ministerial organs are co-operating
with the aforementioned groups and to what
extent. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that
the securiry working group is closely examining
several areas of European security including risk
assessment, the implications for European securiry
of developments in Central and Eastem Europe,
the situation in the Mediterranean and the Magh-
reb, disarmament and arms control. The defence
implications of much of its work are undeniable.
47. In talks your Rapporteur had with the new
Secretary-General of the Council of the European
Union, Mr. Trumpf, on 13th October 1994,
brought him no specific information about the
new structures of the common foreign and secur-
ity policy, nor about the way co-operation might
work between that body, the WEU authorities and
the European Commission. It appeared, however,
that the new Secretariat-General of the Council
considers itself to be at the same level ensuring
continuity and upholding European interests in
face of a strong presidency of the Union. Subse-
quently, the Secretary-General of the Council of
the Union should be invited to explain in detail to
the Political Committee the working of the secur-
ity structures created within the Union.
48. However, in the context of a gradual trans-
fer to the European Union of powers hitherto
belonging to WEU as sole organisation respon-
sible for European security and defence, we are
witnessing an assignment of responsibilities in
security maffers to the CFSP and of those with
defence implications to WEU.
49. However, in view of the fact that security
and defence are closely intertwined, it is difficult to
imagine that the assignment of the former to the
common foreign and security policy and the latter
to WEU can succeed in the long term if it is hoped
to advance towards procedures allowing Euro-
peans to reach joint positions on these matters and
to act together. SufEce it to recall that the structure
of the Political Division of the WEU Secretariat-
General now includes a " Defence Policy'o section
as well as a " Politics and Planning " section, indi-
cating that the WEU ministerial organs are aware
of the importance of these close links and of the
need to harmonise and co-ordinate security and
defence aspects in a single institutional framework.
50. However, the governments of the Twelve
preferred a different solution and decided that it
fell to the Council of the European Union to exa-
mine, case by case, whether security questions
discussed in the framework of the CFSP had
implications in the defence area and whether deci-
sions should be taken on the basis of Article J.4 of
the Maastricht Treaty, in other words, whether
WEU should be called in ".
51. Admittedly, the European Union and WEU
have agreed on arrangements to facilitate co-
ordination of the work. However, the provisions
contained in Chapter IV, Appendix IY of the
document on the implementation of the Maas-
tricht Treaty t3 entitled " Relations between the
Union and WEU'o envisage only " mutual infor-
mation " and " cross-participation " of collabora-
tors from the two secretariats at CFSP and WEU
meetings and it is hardly likely that such arrange-
ments can resolve the fundamental problem.
52. All full members of WEU are of course
represented at the Council of the Union and in the
CFSP institutions and it will therefore be up to
them to make sure that WEU positions are duly
taken into account. But is this situation satisfac-
tory? This, however, is not the real issue. It should
be recalled first and foremost that the CFSP
includes two European countries that are not pre-
pared to become members of WEU: Ireland and
Denmark. Moreover, in 1995 Austria, together
with Finland, Norway and Sweden, depending on
the results of the referendums to be held in the lat-
ter two countries, will become members of the
European Union; Norway alone has stated its
intention to apply for accession to the modified
Brussels Treaty.
53. Furthermore, the two European members
of NAIO which are not members of the European
Union (namely Turkey and Iceland) whose acces-
sion to the European Union is not to be expected
in the foreseeable future are associate members of
WEU, with all the afferent rights excepting those
under Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty.
54. Additionally, WEU has $anted nine Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries associate part-
nership status, offering these countries a wide
range ofoptions for co-operation and participation
in the work of its Council and subsidiary organs.
The European Union has, for its part, concluded
Europe Agreements with only six of these coun-
tries, while agreements on a free trade area have
been signed with the three Baltic countries.
55. Under such circumstances several ques-
tions arise: given that the countries which belong
to the CFSP group of the European Union antl
those of the WEU group are not the same, the pro-
blem of a multi-speed Europe emerges in relations
between these two organisations, raising an issub
which has not yet surfaced in public debate.
12. See Chapter IV, Appendix I, of the document on the
implementation of the Maastricht Treary.
13. Document l4l2,8th April 1994.
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56. There is undeniably a nucleus in European
defence and security matters 
- 
namely WEU. This
nucleus includes the full member countries, in
other words the signatories of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty and the countries that have acceded to
the treaty. Mutual assistance obligations under
this treaty and the development of joint positions
in the event of a threat to peace bind the member
countries together more firmly than obligations
under any other European or Atlantic treaty cur-
rently in force.
57. It should therefore first be noted that, as
compared with the European Union and the CFSP,
WEU member countries have reached a more
advanced stage of co-operation, thanks to the
reactivation of WEU which has led to full appli-
cation of the treaty. Moreover, WEU's intergo-
vernmental system has not prevented its member
countries from taking a large number of decisions
of a political, structural and operational nature.
WEU is not yet fully operational but it is making
progress thanks to the homogeneity of its mem-
bership.
58. Co-operation in the CFSP framework is not
yet as close or as advanced, partly because it is
founded on a treaty entailing far vaguer obliga-
tions and partly because its participants include
one neuffal coun0ry (and soon perhaps four) and
one NATO member country, Denmark, which
refuses nonetheless to take part in closer co-ope-
ration in defence matters in the framework of
WEU.
59. The parallelism between WEU and the
CFSP and the procedures envisaged for interac-
tion between them should not therefore act as a
brake or block WEU's political action should
agreement in the CFSP framework appear impos-
sible or if CSFP decision-making is reduced to the
lowest corrmon denominator.
60. With a revision of the treaties in prospect
during the intergovernmental conference in 1996,
several matters therefore have to be settled: frst,
WEU must be made fully operational and able to
act. It must then be ensured that the organisation
can continue to develop its political action in
autonomous fashion and according to its own
rules, even after 1998. Your Rapporteur shares the
opinion expressed by the French Ambassador to
WEU on 29th September last in Brussels in an
address given at the Centre for European Policy
Studies which holds that the problem of merging
WEU and the European Union as such is a secon-
dary problem; what maffers is that there should be
something going on in WEU so that there is some-
thing to merge with the European Union. Any pre-
mafure attempt to replace the modified Brussels
Treaty or incorporate it wholly or partly into a
new treaty of European Union between sixteen
member states would endanger WEU o'acquis "
and cause the mutual obligations of the partners to
be weakened. For this reason it might be interes-
ting to have more details of ideas, recently referred
to in the United Kingdom press ra, which suggest
that defence policy might become the fourth pillar
of the Union, which would be separate from the
CFSP.
61. Thfud, it should be stipulated that several
WEU member countries will be able to take inde-
pendent political initiatives, either on WEU's own
behalf or on behalf of the European Union,
without flrst having to have received a mandate
from the latter, contrary to the present provisions
of the Maastricht Treaty. Should the European
Union be unable to reach agreement on an initiat-
ive from WEU, the lafter should be free to forge
ahead.
62. Mr. L6otard, Minister of Defence of France,
stated very pertinently, during the colloquy that
the Assembly organised in Paris on 17th October
1994:
" I believe that in future WEU will gain
greater credibility and political efficiency.
Those who hesitate about this organisation
developing a r6le of its own should realise
that Europe's credibility on the intematio-
nal scene depends on that. "
In developing a true joint security and defence
doctrine which might be set out in a white paper
on security, WEU should, as the French minister
emphasised on this occasion, receive a mandate
from the highest European authorities.
63. To facilitate decision-making in areas
within its purview and to achieve the necessary
political impetus, the WEU Council should be
constituted, when necessary, as the " European
security and defence council " at the level of
heads of state and of govemment that might meet
when necessary on the occasion of meetings of
the European Council.
IV.The problems of enlargingWEU
64. To follow a coherent European security
policy based on the nucleus formed by WEU,
solutions must be found to problems stemming
from the fact that neither the member countries of
the Union and the WEU member countries, nor
the European members of NATO and the mem-
bers of WEU are one and the same. Before the
Maastricht Treaty was concluded the WEU Coun-
cil's policy on admitting new member countries
was rightly based on criteria stating that enlarge-
ment should not prejudice in any way the " acquis ",
cohesion or homogeneity of WEU but should
contribute to strengthening European security. In
t3
14. The Independent, 21st September 1994.
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this context, the Assembly had immediately sup-
ported Portugal and Spain's request for accession
to WEU.
65. When Tirrkey and Greece also made known
their wish to accede to the modified Brussels
Treaty (in summer 1988 and December 1988 res-
pectively), the Assembly expressed its firm view
that the two countries should frst settle their bila-
teral disputes to avoid any weakening of WEU's
internal cohesion and particularly of the scope of
Article V of its treaty. However with the conclu-
sion of the Maastricht Treaty, Greece was invited
to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty, while
WEU had to abandon the policy referred to above
and was obliged to stipulate in the Petersberg
declaration of 19th lane 1992 that the founding
treaties of WEU and the Atlantic Alliance would
not be invoked in disputes between member states
of either of the two organisations.
66. The weakening of the scope of Article V of
the modified Brussels Treaty will therefore beco-
me a reality once the process of ratification of the
protocol of accession of Greece to WEU is com-
pleted. Moreover the continuing conflict between
Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia and the crisis that has developed
recently between Greece and Albania, along with
Greece's ambiguous position towards the conflict
raging in former Yugoslavia, are together likely to
increase WEU's difficulties in reaching agree-
ment between the ten on a security policy.
67. As to WEU's relations with the European
members of NATO that are not members of the
European Union, the WEU Council had to draw
the consequences of the decision it took at Maas-
tricht to link full membership of WEU with mem-
bership of the European Union. Article J.4 of the
Maastricht Treaty considers WEU solely as an
integral part of the development of the European
Union without referring to the nature of its rela-
tions with the Atlantic Alliance. Conversely,
declaration I of the WEU member countries
appended to the Maastricht Treaty states that
'o WEU will be developed as the defence compo-
nent of the European Union and as the means to
strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic
Alliance"'s.
68. However, it appears that the same impor-
tance is not being attached to this second aspect of
WEU's r6le as to the first. For this reason the
WEU member countries decided to invite the
European members of NATO not members of the
European Union to become, not fulI members, but
associate members only of WEU. This decision
specifically concems Iceland and Tirrkey. To date,
Iceland has not applied to become a member of
the European Union but political discussion
within the counfiry reveals that a change of heart
towards the Union is in progress, influenced by
the decision of the Scandinavian countries to join.
If lceland were to apply this would not present a
major problem for the European Union. However
the situation with Turkey is different. Although,
since 1987, the latter has applied to join frst the
European Community, then the European Union,
the prospects of its being admitted in the fore-
seeable future are hardly realistic. The association
agreement between Turkey and the European
Community dates from 1964 and the European
Union is currently engaged in negotiations for
establishing a customs union with Thrkey in 1995.
69. Tirkey's importance to European security
has not lessened, despite the end of East-West
confrontation and of the Soviet threat against the
south-east flank of the alliance. Rather, Tirkey's
r6le and influence continue to grow, as evidenced
by the development of its relations with Russia,
with the Islamic countries bordering on Russia
and in the Caucasus, with the countries of the
Near and Middle East and of its Balkans policy.
At the summit meeting in Istanbul that ended on
l9th October 1994 between the heads of state of
six Turkish-speaking republics 
- 
Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Turkey, Tirrkmenistan
and Uzbekistan 
- 
discussions included the diverse
hostilities in the region, particularly in Nagorno-
Karabakh, and the hope was expressed that the
United Nations and the CSCE would play a more
effective r6le in these matters, which incurred the
irritation of Moscow 
'u.
70. Again, under fire on account of human
rights violations and/or for its handling of the
Kurdish problem, Tirkey is experiencing a num-
ber of difficulties in obtaining recognition as a full
member of the Westem European group of demo-
cracies. Additionally, the unresolved status of
Cyprus (which has applied for membership of the
European Union) and the other dffierences that
still exist between Tirkey and Greece continue to
weigh upon the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance
and against Turkey's efforts to draw closer to the
European Union and to WEU. A petition submit-
ted to the President of the Assembly of WEU on
25th June 1994 by Mr. Monnot, a writer, even
requests that Tirrkey be refused associate member
status in WEU.
71. It remains to be seen whether the recent
appointment of Mr. Mumtaz Soysal as Minister
for Foreign Affairs should be regarded as a sign of
change in Tirrkish policies towards the West, and
if so, a change in which direction. In any event, it
must be entirely in Westem Europe's interest for
Turkey again to become a factor of stability in the
region and for it to retain as close links as possible
with westem security and defence structures.
I 5. Rapporteur's italics.
l4
16. Le Monde,2lst October 1994.
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72. Similar considerations, it would appear, led
the WEU Council to agree at its Kirchberg meet-
ing on a declaration intended to strenghen the sta-
tus of WEU associate members, while stressing
that this declaration did not entail any changes to
the " Document on Associate Membership "
adopted in Rome on 20th November 1992.
73. The Council therefore decided that associ-
ate members had " full rights to nominate forces
answerable to WEU ", to " nominate officers
to the Planning Cell " and that they should be
" connected as soon as possible to the WEUCOM
network for all communications concerning mee-
tings and activities in which [they] participate ".
Lastly the Council invited the Assembly to " exa-
mine further the present arrangements for the par-
ticipation of parliamentarians from associate
member countries ". All these declarations cannot
meet the aspirations of Turkey which has always
pressed to be admitted to full membership of
WEU. The meeting on 24th June 1994 between
the President of the Assembly and the President of
the Grand National Assembly of Turkey together
with the letter sent to the President of the Assem-
bly by two Turkish parliamentarians on 14th June
1994 testify to this.
74. It should be stated from the outset that the
Assembly cannot substitute for the Council when
the latter is unable to reach a clear decision.
Among the member countries, opinions are divi-
ded on the substantive issue of whether member-
ship of WEU should continue to be linked solely
to membership of the European Union. The dis-
cussion embarked on in the Political Committee,
and at the plenary session when Recommendation
558 
'? was adopted requesting the Council to
" reconsider the WEU declaration II annexed to
the Maastricht Treaty with a view to allowing the
European members of NATO which are not mem-
bers of the European Union the right to accede to
the modified Brussels Treaty ", demonstrates that
there was no unanimity among parliamentarians
on this question either.
75. Furthermore, in accordance with the brief it
was given by the Presidential Committeeo the
Political Committee carefully examined the
Council's invitation to review the arrangements
the Assembly made for the participation of parlia-
mentarians from associate member countries on
the basis of the Council's declaration further to
the document on associate membership of WEU
of 20th November 1992 published on 9th May
1994. The Political Committee reached the
conclusion that this declaration included no fac-
tors calling for a reexamination of the arrange-
ments agreed by the Assembly in Documentl4l6
regarding the participation of parliamentarians
from associate member countries.
76. However, the development of the Euro-
pean Union and WEU's relations with Turkey will
constitute a crucial element in any European secu-
rity policy and must therefore remain on the agen-
da; when preparing oo Maastricht II o', the Euro-
pean countries members of the European Union
must know whether they wish to regard Turkey as
an integral part of the area the future Union is to
occupy and the WEU member countries must
decide to what extent they are ready to integrate
Turkey into the structures guaranteeing Europe's
external security.
77. The proposal put forward by the French
Prime Minister, Mr. Edouard Balladur, in his
speech on 8th September 1994 to course partici-
pants at the French Institut des hautes 6tudes de
d6fense nationale (IHEDN) '8, which inclined
towards participation by the Central and Eastem
European countries concerned in a European
Council meeting devoted to discussion of a white
paper on European security, highlights another
institutional aspect of a European security policy,
namely harmonisation of WEU, European Union
and NATO policies towards the Central and Eas-
tern European countries.
78. At an informal meeting of the European
Union foreign affairs ministers on 1lth September
" 1994re, the sixteen discussed the overall guide-
lines prepared by the German presidency, the aim
of which was to bring ten Central and Eastern
European countries closer to the Euro-Atlantic
structures, namely the European Union, WEU and
NAIO. These guidelines envisage rapprochement
of the countries concerned 
- 
the four Visegrad
countries, Romania and Bulgaria, the three Baltic






The first option advocates parallel
admission of all of the countries concemed to the
three organisations.
- 
The second allows the possibility of
separate accessions, according to the specific
interests of the applicant countries.
- 
The third involves a stage-by-stage pro-
cedure for individual accessions over a specified
period but requiring all countries involved to
attain membership status of the three organisa-
tions within roughly ten years.
80. It is clear that discussions on such an
approach, details of which are not known to your
Rapporteur, are only at a very early stage. It should
therefore be recalled that a parallel approach by
17. See the report by Mr. Ferrari on WEU in the process of
European Union 
- 
reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of
the Council, Document l4l7 l0thMay 1994.
18. Le Monde,9th September 1994.
19. Frankfurter Allgemeine Z,eiung,12th September 1994.
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WEU, the Union and NAIO to the Central and
Eastern European countries is at the moment still
a very long way off and that the objectives of this
policy of convergence are far from being clearly
formulated.
81. The decision taken by the WEU Council at
Kirchberg, on 9th May 1994, $anting the nine
countries of the Forum of Consultation, namely
the four Visegrad countries, Bulgaria, Romania
and the three Baltic countries the status of asso-
ciate partner of WEU does not concem Slovenia.
The recent differences between Italy and Slovenia
on minorities and other questions of neighbourli-
ness should be settled quickly in order to avoid
them having negative repercussions on questions
of security and preventing this former Yugoslav
Republic from also obtaining a status of associate
partner in WEU. The European Union on the
other hand is linked by " Europe Agreements "
only to the Visegrad countries, Bulgaria and
Romania, while the three Baltic countries have for
the time being concluded free trade agreements
with the Union. However at its Corfu meeting on
26th June 1994, the European Council recalled
that the goal of the Union remained the conclu-
sion with these countries of Europe Agreements,
intended to help them prepare for accession at
a later date. Hence the Union is in contact with
Slovenia with a view to examining terms for the
conclusion of a Europe Agreement. As to NATO,
the ten Central and Eastern European countries
mentioned are all NACC members and have joi-
ned the partrrership for peace while Lithuania has
made an official application to become a full
member of the Washington Treary.
82. As far as the objectives that the three orga-
nisations concerned are pursuing in their relations
with Central and Eastern Europe, only the Euro-
pean Union has clearly decided that associate
countries that so wish may become members of
the European Union as soon as they are able to
fulfill the appropriate conditions. At its Corfu
meeting, the European Council stated that " the
subsequent implementation (of the Europe Agree-
ments) is one of the essential conditions of mem-
bership " 20.
83. NAIO, on the other hand, without opening
up any definite prospect of membership for the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, merely
stated at its summit meeting on 10th-11th January
1994 * that the allianss, as provided for in Article
10 of the Washington Treaty, remains open to
membership of other European states in a position
to further the principles of the treaty and to contri-
bute to the security of the North Atlantic area. "
The communiqu6 continued: " We expect and
would welcome NATO expansion that would reach
to democratic states to our Easto as part of an evo-
lutionary process, taking into account political and
security developments in the whole of Europe. "
84. The use of the term " democratic states to
our East " is liable to give rise to all kinds of
conjecture particularly regarding Russia, as the
recent controversy between the German and Uni-
ted States defence ministers on the prospects of a
NATO enlargement to the East serves to demons-
trate 2r. It is now necessary to await the results of
the recent steps taken by the United States in
NATO in order to be able to be more specific
about enlarging NATO towards Eastern Europe
without including Russia 2.
85. Nor does the purpose of the WEU Coun-
cil's decision to grant the nine countries participa-
ting in the WEU Forum of Consultation associate
partner status in WEU emerge sufficiently clearly
from the document issued at the time 4. The refe-
rence made in this document to the decisions of
the European Council and the intention, exptcitly
stated, of preparing the counffies concerned for
integration into the European Union, and, in the
longer term, for their accession, is nonetheless
indicative of the direction taken, but without ope-
ning up a real prospect of the accession of these
countries to WEU.
86. Rather the document states that the status
of associate partner of WEU does not involve any
change to the modified Brussels Treaty, and the
Council representatives continue to stress that it
has no legal effect. Nevertheless the Council has
agreed with the associate partners on a system,
described in detail, which allows them limited
participation in the work of the Council and its
subsidiary organs. The degree of such participa-
tion and of information available to the associate
partners on the activities of the organs of WEU is
very variable, and the only corlmon principle is
that they may not block a decision on which
consensus has been reached by the member states.
87. The complexity of the modalities of the
new status established at Luxembourg is such as
to offer little encouragement to the Assembly
when it takes up the Council's invitation to consi-
der the possibility of participation by associate
partners in its work. In accordance with the man-
date which the Presidential Committee gave the
Political Committee for proposing an operative
text on the adoption of an appropriate status for
delegations or countries becoming associate part-
ners before the matter is placed before the Com-
mittee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, your
Rapporteur has proceeded to reexamine these
questions.
Frankfurter Allgemeine T,eittxtg, 12th September 1994.
International Herald Tribune, 28th October 1994.
Document 1422, 22nd May 1994.
2t.
22.
23.20. See Europe No. 6260, 26th Jwrc 1994.
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88. Such an examination nevertheless requires
clarification from the Council on several points:
firstly on the date of implementation of the status.
According to the Document on the Modalities of
3rd May 1994, the provisions apply from that
date; however, it is stipulated that the status will
officially take effect when:
- 
" the Hellenic Republic, currently an
active observer, becomes a member of
WEU and the Republic of Iceland, the
Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of
Turkey, currently active observers, beco-
me associate members of WEU;
- 
the associate partner has signed a Europe
Agreement with the European Union. "
89. This latter condition relates to the Baltic
countries. Lastly there must be clarification of the
meaning of the following statement: " In the
meantime the associate partners will be conside-
red as active observers to WEU with respect to the
provisions of their new status o'. Moreover the
financial contribution arrangements arising from
the participation of the associate partners in WEU
activities should be made known once these are
established. In this connection on 15th June 1994,
the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, addres-
sing the plenary session of the Assembly, stated:
[This new status] " will certainly have
financial consequences. One of the presi-
dency's tasks will be to persuade the mem-
ber states' governments to provide the
finance for carrying out these political obli-
gations. I also see it as the task of every
member of this Assembly to urge their
government, and in particular their minister
of finance, to ensure that their country's
financial contributions to WEU are increa-
sed in next year's budget. "
The Presidential Committee's meeting with the
Permanent Council of WEU in Brussels on 27th
September 1994 unfortunately provided no
enlightenment on the position regarding financial
contributions to the WEU budget from associate
partners.
90. Moreover, account must be taken of the
administrative and financial consequences of the
increase in the parliamentary delegations of asso-
ciate partners participating in the work of the
Assembly. Order 85 on the enlargement of
WEU z rightly emphasised that " any reasonable
enlargement of the number of parliamentary dele-
gations participating in the Assembly will be
impossible without major adjustments of the
Assembly's accommodation and budget. " Unfor-
tunately, the Assembly's approaches in this regard
towards the Council have not yet led to results
that might lead it to believe that it will be able to
pursue its future activities stemming from a consi-
derably enlarged membership in normal working
conditions. Furthermore, on 15th June 1994, the
Chairman-in-Office of the Council confirmed to
the Assembly that the entry into force of this sta-
tus was immediate, that meetings of the Perma-
nent Council were being held in the presence of
the new partners and that the latter would also
attend the forthcoming ministerial meeting.
91. In order not to delay further the participa-
tion of parliamentarians of the states which have
become associate partners of WEU, the Presiden-
tial Committee decided on 18th October 1994 to
enlarge the delegations of permanent observers of
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Romania and Slovakia from two to four members
and to invite the nine associate partner countries
each to appoint an observer to the Political, Defen-
ce and Technological and Aerospace Committees
and to the Committee for Parliamentary and Public
Relations, without prejudging the adoption of a
status for the delegations of these countries. This
new statuso which is to be worked out in detail by
the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privi-
leges, should enable the representatives of the
associate partner countries to participate in com-
mittee meetings with consultative voting rights
and in plenary sessions of the Assembly without
voting rights. The delegations of these counffies
should be constituted in conformity with the provi-
sions in force in the Council of Europe.
92. The Bureau of the Assembly has referred to
the Political Committee a petition submitted by
Mr. Jarolimek, Chairman of the Committee of
Free Czechs and Slovaks in the Netherlands, to
the President of the Assembly, requesting him to
" deny any form of membership of WEU to the
Czech Republic and to the Slovak Republic, as
long as they discriminate, confiscate and do not
prosecute (ex) communist torturers, i.e. as long as
they do not respect the basic human rights and are
unjust ". Identical petitions were presented to the
Assembly by Dr. Radvakova, a chemist, and Mr.
Hajek, a scientist. To decide what action should
be taken on these petitions, the committee reques-
ted the opinion of the Council of Europe on the
grounds for them. The committee was informed
that the problems referred to in these petitions had
been dealt with in full by the Council of Europe. It
is therefore not necessary for the Assembly of
WEU to re-open a debate on these questions.
93. However, while is is necessary to define the
status of the delegations from states which become
associate parhers of WEU, one must not lose sight
of the basic task which is to define the conditions in
which associate partners might subsequently be
invited to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty. If
the wish is to avoid ffierent security zones being
24. Adopted by the Standing Committee in Rome on 19th
April 1993, Document 1360.
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set up in the regions in question, it is not enough to
make accession to WEU dependent merely upon
membership of the European Union.
94. For the conditions fixed by the European
Union for countries wishing to become members
are only partly dictated by external security
considerations. It is necessary therefore to exami-
ne the question more deeply to ascertain what
significance and weight should be attached to
security concerns as compared with other consi-
derations, of an economic nature for example. Is
it not possible to conceive of a situation that
would require accelerated convergence of WEU
and the associate partner countries on account of
overriding security considerations, even before
other conditions for entry had been met? Nowa-
days, the impression often is rather that security
policy arguments are used as a pretext for not
making progress.
95. The WEU member countries have in point
of fact already overtaken the European Union in
terms of their policy towards the East, without
waiting for the European Union to negotiate Euro-
pe Agreements with them. The concern to ensure
consistency between WEU, European Union and
NATO initiatives towards the countries of Cenral
and Eastern Europe which, according to the
second part of the ttrfuty-ninth annual report of the
Council to the Assembly 5, has until now guided
the work of the Council's Special Working Group,
is wholly jusffied. Nevertheless WEU cannot dis-
pense with its own assessment of the importance
of the security situation in Central and Eastern
Europe for the security of Western Europe and the
implications for the development of a common
defence policy in its own framework. It is on the
basis of such an analysis that WEU must decide to
what extent convergence with its associate part-
ners can be speeded up. WEU will furthermore
have to present and sustain its conclusions to the
European Union and NA[O. To do so WEU may
of course take into consideration studies and thin-
king in these two fora to ensure consistency. As to
cunent thinking within NAIO, it is worth noting
the recent declaration by Mr. Alexander Vershbow,
Foreign Affairs Adviser to President Clinton, sta-
ting that there is no need to wait until the Central
and Eastern countries are integrated into Europe
before NATO opens up to them 26.
V Some suggestians for a pragmatic approath
to a European secarity and. defence policy
96. Joint assessment of risks to European secu-
rity remains an essential basis for formulating a
common security and defence policy. Such
Document 1411,5th April 1994.
Le Soir,9th September 1994.
assessment depends in large measure on harmoni-
sing the interests of the various member countries.
To this end, it is necessary flrst for each country to
be asked 
- 
possibly by questionnaire 
- 
to state its
basic concerns and to specify the areas in which,
in its opinion, a joint, multilateral approach would
be required and those for which states should
retain a national responsibility.
97. In a speech given the University of Leyden
on 7th September 1994, the United Kingdom
Prime Minister, Mr. Major, observed for example
that:
" With France, Britain is one of only two
nations in the Union which still have a glo-
bal reach to their foreign policies. Alone in
Europe, the United Kingdom is a member
simultaneously of the United Nations Secu-
rity Council, the Economic Summit and of
the Commonwealth which now comprises
one third of the worldos nations. We have a
deep involvement in all of the continents of
the world. "
and also quoted Hong Kong as an example, as the
United Kingdom regards the territory as being
solely a matter for domestic policy, an argument
which will hold good only until 1997.
98. Starting from a drawing-board where each
member country identified its essential interests
and the areas it felt to be of most direct concern,
areas of approximate convergence of interests
would need to be defined. Agreement would then
have to be reached, based on this definition, as to
what crisis or conflict situation might be likely to
affect European security and other common
interests in such a way as to require joint military
action. In this conneclion it is pbssibie to draw on
the following criteria set out in the report on the
probable evolution of the common foreign and
security policy (CFSP) addressed to the Euro-
pean Council in Lisbon on 26th and 27th June
1992:
" It is possible at this stage to list certain
factors determining important common
interests ...
- 
the.geographical proximity of a given
regron or country;
- 
an important interest in the political and
economic stability of a region or coun-
try;"
To these criteria might be added other factors to
be determined such as perception of dangers to
the security of citizens of member states etc.
99. There will undoubtedly always be cases
where a particular area of interest will be more
important to some member countries than others.
For this reason there must be agreement, so that





situation is governed by the principle of solidarity
that must come to constitute the pillar of their co-
operation. The entire modified Brussels Treaty is
based on this principle, even if the most explicit
reference to the " close community of interests "
of the WEU member countries is in Article I
which deals with economic co-operation.
100. Differences of perception have been obser-
ved in many western European countries as to the
origins of the conflict in former Yugoslavia and a
certain mistrust noted between European partners,
in particular Paris, London and Bonn, as to their
respective intentions with regard to the manage-
ment of this crisis 27. These differences have
demonstrated how much still remained to be done
to establish unqualified solidarity between all the
member countries.
101. There are numerous ways of reinforcing
this spirit of solidarity which must permeate the
political classes of the nations concerned and not
simply their leaders. From this perspective, the
regular exchanges of senior civil servants taking
place between the foreign affairs ministries of the
CFSP member countries might also be undertaken
within the framework of WEU and should be
extended to defence ministries and possibly even
to the private offices of heads of govemment.
102. In political terms, the senior political
figures with responsibility in WEU must be made
to understand that the organisation should remain
free to take initiatives in the areas of its remit
when the European Union has not made an expli-
cit request. In particular, the Council must be
reminded that if political initiatives and impetus
were to come from WEU, this could assist the
progress of the European Union as a whole. If,
however, the WEU leadership confines itself to
waiting upon the outcome of deliberations in
other European fora, WEU will rapidly become a
secondary organisation, carrying out subordinate
tasks only, like administering the police force in
Mostar, for which, as the Chairmanship-in-Office
observes in its Luxembourg report on Mostar,
WEU is invariably dependent on the outcome of
the negotiations between the European " troika "
and the parties.
103. WEU has a substantial work of analysis to
undertake on European security matters, exten-
ding far beyond the specific problem of a com-
mon defence policy currently being examined in
the Permanent Council. This policy has been defi-
ned by the Director of the WEU Institute for
Security Studies as: 'o a common policy with res-
pect to the use of the armed forces of the member
states of the European Union " a. Such analysis is
Mafthias Jopp, Europa Archiv, 28th July 1994, No.
Institute Butletin No. 12, July 1994.
essential but must be approached in a wider pers-
pective. According to information published in
the press D, the WEU study concerns mainly the
technical aspects, whereas Germany is believed to
be preparing its own study on the more political
problems, and France would also make a separate
contribution. Moreover, the United Kingdom
would no longer be so categorically opposed to
any integration of defence under the umbrella of
the European Union. The foregoing sections have
already referred to the interest there is in coherence
in the thinking of WEU, the European Union and
NATO on enlargement to the East. WEU must the-
refore monitor closely progress achieved within the
framework of the conference on the pact on stabili-
ty, the results of which are to be presented at a
second ministerial-level conference in spring 1995.
To this must be added the assessment of the impli-
cations for European security of developments in
Russia and the CIS countries and the consequences
for the relations of (a possibly enlarged) WEU with
Russia, a subject which will be dealt with in the
report by Mr.Baumel. What implications might
arise from the prospect of a long common border
between Russia and the European Union if Finland
and Norway join? In this respect, one should draw
on Norway's experience of which the observer to
the Political Committee had noted that it was ffi-
nitely better to establish clearly-defined borders
than to create grey areas. The result of the Finnish
referendum on l6th October last when the people
of Finland voted by a comfortable majority in
favour of the country's accession to the European
Union has greatly contributed to such clarification,
irrespective of the way in which Finland now
decides to organise its relations with WEU.
lM. What interaction is there between WEU
and the European Union over the Maghreb coun-
tries and security in the Mediterranean? To what
extent are WEU members able to reach agreement
on actions directed towards crisis-management
and peace-keeping should situations similar to
those in Bosnia, Somalia or Rwanda arise? Is the
co-operation that has been established between
the United States, Russia and certain European
countries representing the European Union with a
view to establishing a peace plan for Bosnia a sign
of a retum to ad hoc coalitions and the balance of
power politics of former years?
105. During the discussion of the working paper
which your Rapporteur presented to the meeting
of the commiffee held on 26th September 1994,
one member wished the present report to contain
a description of the world security situation inclu-
ding the Mediterranean and crisis-flashpoints on
other continents. Your Rapporteur naturally reco-
gnises the importance of continuous assessment
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consequences for Europe's security. He would
recall however that these questions were debated
in particular in Recommendation 559 on Euro-
pean security: crisis-prevention and management,
adopted by the Assembly in June 1994. ln para-
graphs 25 to 28 above, your Rapporteur has
explained the reasons why certain parts of the
reply of the Council to this recommendation can-
not be accepted. However, in this reply the latter
states inter alia: " that the regular meetings of its
working groups and the item ooTopical questions "
on their agendas provide opportunities for regular
assessment of risks and threats affecting peace,
security and European interests. It goes without
saying that the Council will draw the conse-
quences of its findings when they are perceived as
affecting European security ".
106. ln the same reply the Council states that it
" can assure the Assembly that member states,
through the debates taking place at all levels,
always make maximum efforts to seek political
consensus, especially in the event of crises where
WEU is likely to play a r6le ". Unfortunately this
did not work in the case of Rwanda, nor in that of
Somalia. And what consensus has emerged in
WEU over ending the war in Bosnia which now
seems set to escalate further? Admitting that
WEU has virtually no political r6le whatsoever in
this conflict, the address given by Mr. Voorhoeve,
Defence Minister of the Netherlands, at the collo-
quy organised by the Assembly in Paris on 17th
October t994, w as particularly interesting since it
recalled WEU's responsibility in the management
of intemational crises, referring specifically to the
crises in North Africa, Algeria, Egypt, the sou-
thern Sahara, southern Sudan, Burundi, the Per-
sian Gulf etc. Moreover he did not rule out
WEU's playing a pacifying r6le on the Golan
Heights in the event of a peace agteement being
reached between Syria and Israel; he mentioned
the r6le of Iran in central Asia and, lastly, the pro-
blems in the Caribbean and Haiti where he advo-
cated that the WEU member countries contribute
to re-establishing a police force.
107. The minister rightly recalled that the WEU
member countries have neither the will nor the
necessary military means to promote peace in
every area of instability. In this connection he
declared himself in favour of a procedure by
means of which each member country should eva-
luate, case by case," whether our national inter-
ests and values prompt us to get involved or stay
out''. However, does not the development of a
European security and defence policy in fact
make it necessary for joint criteria to be estab-
lished in order to be able to act together?
108. A large part of the thinking on a European
security policy consists in defining the new fac-
tors which, from now, characterise Europe's rela-
tions with NATO, and above all the United States,
since the development of a European security and
defence identiry was confirmed at the last NAIO
summit meeting. However it would appear 
- 
at
least if information published by the press is to be
believed 
- 
that the emergence of this identity and
the strengthening of WEU, its means and autono-
my are at present marking time 30. According to
these reports, the Netherlands, Portugal and the
United Kingdom take a minimalist view of WEU.
Moreover the Assembly learned only from the
Council's reply to Recommendation 556 that the
Permanent Council had created a new Politico-
Military Working Group which has formulated ajoint WEU position on the.CJTF (combined joint
task forces) concept, which has been introduced
in the framework of the alliance consultation pro-
cess. According to the last half-yearly repofi that
the German Government transmiffed to the Bun-
destag on WEU's activities, this position of WEU
was communicated to NAIO on29th June 1994.
What was the outcome? Other questions arise.
How will the United States react if Europe tries to
commit it to guaranteeing the security of the Cen-
tral and Eastern European counffies through an
association with WEU? This would be as unac-
ceptable to the United States as it would be unac-
ceptable to Europeans to give the Americans a
right of veto over the way applicant countries to
the European Union should be dealt with3'. There
must therefore be close co-operation between
WEU and NATO over the policy of enlargement
to the East and WEU must define its thinking in
this regard. According to Mr. L6otard, Minister of
Defence of France, it seems inevitable that the
security guarantees provided by the Brussels
Treaty, on which WEU is founded, and by the
Treaty of Washington in respect of NATO will be
extended to the new members of the European
Union32. Mr. Kinkel, Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Germany, stated on 6th October 1994 that a
country belonging to the Union wishing to join
WEU should also be admitted to NAIO 33. The
proposal of the President of the Russian Federa-
tion might be recalled in this context, suggesting
that a security guarantee be given jointly by
NATO and Russia to the Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries. These proposals have been rejec-
ted out of hand by the countries concerned, parti-
cularly Hungary and Poland. It will also be recalled
that the United States has a tendency to seek to
settle world-wide strategic questions through bila-
teral co-operation with Russia, to the detriment of
Westem Europe. The increasingly frequent calls
for a new " transatlantic contract " reflect a gro-
wing anxiety: are the instruments of nansatlantic
30. See for example Le Monde, 29th September 1994;
article on the redistribution of rOles between Americans and
Europeans within NATO.
31. Daniel Vemet, Le Monde, l2thMay 1994.
32. Le Figaro, 30th September 1994.
33. Frankfirter Allgemeine 7*,itwrg,7th October 1994.
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security created during the cold war period suffi-
cient to meet the challenges presented by the fac-
tors that now determine international relations?
109. WEU must, furthermore, continue to deve-
lop a coherent concept of its own r6le vis-d-vis the
United Nations, particularly in the context of
peace-keeping and crisis-management. Recent
talks between the United Nations Secretary-Gene-
ral and the representatives of the majority of
regional organisations seem to have yielded no
concrete results. It is important therefore that
WEU should state its position as clearly and
convincingly as possible at the United Nations,
the more so as the decisions it has taken over the
Petersberg missions have lent it credibility as a
player. Moreover, is WEU assured of being able
to speak with one voice in the Security Council
where it is represented by two of its member
countries? The matter needs to be looked into fur-
ther. The Rapporteur would refer in this connec-
tion to Recommendation 549 and to his report on
political relations between the United Nations and
WEU and their consequences for the development
of WEU'.
110. The same applies to WEU's relations with
the CSCE, which is to hold its next ministerial
conference in Budapest on 5th-6th December
1994. The WEU ministers in their Kirchberg
communiqu6 agreed:
" that the CSCE, as the only European and
transatlantic forum covering all of Europe,
must be strengthened to avoid the emergen-
ce of new divisions. To this end, they reaf-
firmed their governments' resolution to
commit the necessary resources and to
continue working for a reasonable division
of labour with the CSCE giving effect to
the concept of mutually reinforcing institu-
tions developed in the 1992 Helsinki
Declaration. "
111. What will WEU's position be and what will
it do to make known these intentions at the Buda-
pest conference? Moreover, how will it react to
the Russian proposals to subordinate its work to
the co-ordination of the CSCE?
ll2. To retum finally to efforts aimed at streng-
thening and improving the effectiveness of the
instruments available to WEU for discharging its
responsibilities, there will also need to be discus-
sion of the problems described below. After the
decision to reduce the term of office of the WEU
Presidency to six months from lst July 1994,the
Assembly should be ffiormed of the results of the
studies by the Permanent Council on questions
raised by the harmonisation of the presidencies of
the European Union and WEU which are still pen-
ding. It is interesting to note in this connection
that the study published by the Bertelsmann Foun-
dation on Europe 96 contains a programme of
reforms for the European Union that proposes
extending the term of office of the presidency
of the Council of the Union and the European
Council by at least a year in order to ensure conti-
nuity of work. One of the systems under discus-
sion provides, for example, for the replacement of
the alphabetical rotation of the presidency by a
system that would achieve a better allocation of
the presidential terms between the large and small
countries. Another proposal from the French
Senator, Mr. Jean-Frangois Poncet 35, aims at the
free election of the President of the European
Council for a term of two years. In any event, this
problem must remain on the agenda in order to
achieve a solution that increases the effectiveness
of the work of the organisation. To this end,
WEU's policy planning and decision-making
must also be strengthened and the political section
within the Secretariat-General considerably rein-
forced.
113. When considering the future r6le of WEU
within the range of mutually reinforcing organisa-
tions, one must also consider the risk that certain
institutions are developing within WEU with dif-
ferent levels of participation and at different
speeds; inter alia the Council and its subsidiary
organs can now meet as 24,15,13 (in the case of
WEAG) or nine participant counffies. In another
context the following development can be obser-
ved: certain member countries reach agreement
within a bilateral framework and then invite other
member countries of WEU to join them. A case in
point is the creation of the European corps which
was originally a Franco-German initiative. There
has recently been another initiative that aims to
reinforce bilateral co-operation in armaments
matters by setting up a Franco-German arma-
ments agency. These last two initiatives, intended
as they are to facilitate and speed up projects
whose progress is running into difficulties in the
framework of WEU and benefit member coun-
tries as a whole, must obviously be supported.
However, one should avoid such initiatives deve-
loping independently and giving rise to structures
separate from those of WEU.
VI. Irnplications for the preparalion of the
1 99 6 intergov ernme ntal confere nce
lI4. On a procedural level, it should be recalled
that the European Council decided, at its meeting
in Corfi: on24th and 25th lune 1994, to create a
" think tank " to prepare for the 1996 intergovern-
mental conference, made up of representatives
of the foreign affairs ministries of member states
and the President of the Commission. This is to be
34. Document 1389, 8th November 1993.
2t
35. Franlifrrter Allgemeine Znitung, l9th September 1994.
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chaired by a personality designated by the Span-
ish Govemment and will begin work in June 1995;
the conclusion of this work will be the presenta-
tion of a report in due course to the European
Council meeting at the end of 1995. It has further-
more been decided, following a German proposal,
reception of which was initially somewhat unen-
thusiastic on the part of the majority of countries,
that two representatives of the European Parlia-
ment will participate in the work of the think tank.
115. This procedure, based on the provisions of
Articles N, paragraph2 andlA,paragraph 6 of the
Maastricht Treaty has as yet no equivalent in
WEU, despite the fact that the declaration of the
WEU member countries annexed to the Maas-
tricht Treaty stipulates that: " WEU will re-exa-
mine the present provisions in 1996. This re-exa-
mination will take account of the progress and
experience acquired and will extend to relations
between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance. " It will
again be noted that the WEU declaration distin-
guishes itself from the parallel provisions of the
Maastricht Treaty by its added transatlantic
dimension.
116. If WEU wishes to assert its own thinking
and attitudes in the framework of the 1996 confe-
rence and to avoid being faced with a fait accom-
pli, as was the case in the negotiations on the
Maastricht Treary, it is essential that those with
responsibility should begin their analysis imme-
diately and ensure that their conclusions are taken
account of from the outset in the work of the think
tank set up by the European Union.
ll7. Given the importance of this matter, the
task of reviewing the existing provisions should
be assigned to a WEU working group created
exclusively for that purpose. The Permanent
Council and its working groups are already too
overburdened with other tasks to be able to take
on this particular work. The new group should be
established at the next ministerial meeting and be
made up of representatives of the foreign affairs
and defence ministries, the Secretariat-General
and a representative of each subsidiary body.
There should also be participation by the WEU
Assembly in this work.
118. This " WEU think tank'o must begin work
in early 1995 in order to be ready to present its
views in time to the European Union authorities.
ln view of the working relationships established
between WEU and the Union, the two organisa-
tions should inform one another on the progress of
their work, providing, for example, for 'o cross-
participation " of collaborators from both secreta-
riats at the relevant meetings of the two groups.
However, care must also be taken that the WEU
group keeps the NAIO institutions duly informed
of its studies. As to the chairmanship of the WEU
think tank, this should be offered to a personality
chosen in consultation with the Assembly.
ll9. Among the various subjects for examina-
tion, the Assembly should concenttate in particu-
lar on organising conffol by parliamentary repre-
sentatives over a future European security and
defence system, taking account of experience gai-
ned within the framework of Westem European
Union. It should be noted in this context that the
presidents of the national parliaments meeting in
Bonn on 13th September 1994 stressed the need
for increased participation by national parlia-
ments in preparing the European Union reform
due in 199636.
120. It should be recalled in this connection that
in several member countries of the Union, parti-
cularly France and Germany, the constitutional
courts have been called upon to examine whether
the Maastricht Treaty is in conformity with the
national constitution. In France, the Constitu-
tional Council clarified in its decision of 9th April
199237 that the European Parliament did not consti-
fute a sovereign assembly with overall powers and
which might conffibute to the exercise of national
sovereignty. In its decision of 12th October 199338
pronouncing the Maasfficht Treaty in conformity
with the Basic Law of the Federal Republic, the
Constitutional Court of Germany stipulated clear-
ly that, in the context of European integration, the
transfer of duties and powers to the European ins-
titutions should not jeopardise the legitimacy of
the Bundestag and its influence on the exercise of
state power in such a way as to violate the prin-
ciple of democracy guaranteed by the Basic Law.
l2l. With a view to developing a series of models
for a system of parliamentary control, the basic
assumption should be that the 1996 conference
will not change the system whereby decisions on
questions with defence implications remain the
exclusive province of national governments, mee-
ting in WEU in an intergovernmental structure.
Mr. Heathcoat-Amory Secretary of State for the
Foreign Office of the United Kingdom recently
put forward the following arguments in favour of
such an arrangement:
" This arrangement has a number of impor-
tant advantages. The different forms of
membership and relationship embodied in
WEU's variable geometry 
- 
full members,
associate members, associate partners and
observers 
- 
are essential to accommodate
the different positions and interests of cur-
rent, and imminent, European Union mem-
bers in the defence field. WEU's institutio-
nal separation also offers a way of getting
36. Franlf,irter Allgemeine Zeimg, l4th September 1994.
37. Joumal ofEciel de la R6publique frangaise, llth April
1992,page 5354.




around the practical problem of taking
account of the extra-European obligations
and interests of various Union members.
The time is not yet ripe to try and squeeze
these different interests into a single strait-jacket. This would mean either forcing
states into false positions, which will prove
untenable in the long run, or weakening the
nature of the mutual defence commitment
which fies at the heart of WEU. We have to
recognise that common defence is deadly
serious. [t must be a matter of deeds, not
words, of deep-reaching solidarity, not sim-
ply the highest common denominator 
-
especially at a time when Europe faces new
risks and new responsibilities.
NATO shows beyond any doubt that in the
defence field intergovernmentalism is not
second best; it is what works. I do not belie-
ve that any realistic observer can think that
European governments are ready to delega-
te decisions on defence, which are ultima-
tely decisions about the lives and deaths of
their soldiers, to a supranational body or,
even less likely, to majority voting. "3e
Under these circumstances, the Christian Demo-
crat Group of the German Parliament's idea of
$anting the European Commission the powers of
a European government, while the European Par-
liament would have the character of a legislative
body on an equal footing with the Council, the lat-
ter being called upon to take on the r6le of second
chamber, cannot serve as a realistic basis of dis-
cussion for organising a defence Europe.
122. It is furthermore interesting to note that an
earlier document, prepared in August 1993 by the
same parliamentary group, stressed the need to
consider another bicameral system based on
representation of national parliaments at Euro-
pean level, thus forming a European Senate. In a
recent article4, Mr. Jean-Frangois Poncet took up
this concept in the following terms:
'o ... For as long as there are no political par-
ties, trades-unions, professional associa-
tions at European level, for as long as there
is no European govemment and opposition,
democratic legitimacy must continue to be
provided largely through national states.
This means that the dual nature of the
Union, its supranational and intergovern-
mental structure, must be maintained for
many years to come. This is why it might
be useful to create a European Senate
representing the national parliaments ... "
39. The next step for Western European Union: a British
view, The World Today, Jtly 1994.
40. Frankfurter Allgemei-ne Z,eifiig, l9th September 1994.
Therefore, to avoid the public debate running off
course, it is essential very quickly to develop and
present convincing models which propose that
national parliamentarians are represented in a
European assembly such as that of WEU, an
essential instument of democratic confrol for any
defence organisation that continues to be based on
a system of intergovernmental co-operation. For
unlike the European Parliament, only the national
parliaments and their committees can exercise
direct control over governments and have the right
to participate in the decision-making process.
123. In this instance, it would perhaps be appro-
priate to draw on the relevant provisions of the
European Defence Community Treaty, Article 38
of which provides for " the constitution of an
Assembly of the European Defence Community,
elected on a democratic basis ... based on the prin-
ciple of the separation of powers and having, in
particular, a two-chamber system of representa-
tion.
124. But before proceeding with these various
ffains of thought, one basic question must be rai-
sed: in two or three years, will the time really have
come to exercise the right laid down in Article XII
of the modified Brussels Treaty to terminate a
treaty which has only in recent years again shown
its worth; would there not then be a risk of endan-
gering the gains achieved by the reactivation of
WEU and the success of all the efforts to make it
operational? The more dynamic the organisation
shows itself to be and the more successful its
activities, the less reason there will be to call its
treaty basis into question.
VII. Conclusion
125. Political Europe is currently being recrea-
ted on several fronts. The difficulty of bringing all
of these together to achieve a single structure is
the result, for the time being, of the lack of a clear
vision in relation to several fundamental aspects
essential to the final design of a coherent struc-
ture. In the frst place, the outer limits and size of
the structure are not clearly defined: these depend,
inter alia, on developments in the regions borde-
ring on Europe. Then there is the problem of the
dimensions of the different buildings making up
the overall structure which have to meet different
requirements and accommodate inhabitants
drawn from different families.
126. Under these circumstances, both flexibility
and firmness are necessary. In matters concerning
European security and defence, any initiative
which seeks to reform the present system must be
directed by a need to sffengthen and improve the
security ofEuropean citizens and preserve the sta-
bility of Europe. As to opinions on the rdle of
WEU in the context of building a unified Europe,
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the situation today is very different to the period
prior to the negotiations over Maasricht L WEU
is now in a position to claim substantial gains in
several areas that have been acknowledged as such
and should not be jeopardised by experiments
based solely on institutional considerations.
127. To avoid revised conceptions relating to the
building of a Europe of security and defence lea-
ding to aweakening of that security, the Assembly
and the Council should co-operate more closely in
the coming years and the Assembly in particular
should be more closely associated with the thin-
king and the results of the research and studies of
the Council, its subsidiary bodies and its working
groups. In the words of the Chairman-in-Office of
the Council, addressing the plenary session of our
Assembly on 15th June 1994:
" On the question of the Assembly's parti-
cipation, I have said on several occasions
that it is up to the relevant presidency to
ensure that the procedures are pragmatic
and to consult the Assembly at an early
stage of decision-making. That will also
be possible within the new group set up by
the Council to consider the common Euro-
pean defence policy to be put before the
1996 intergovernmental conference. This
task is expected to take eighteen months.
It will be quite possible in that period for
your Assembly to offer its own input to
the Council, for the Council to refer back
to the presidency of the Assembly and for
this to result in very effective co-opera-
tion. "
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